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ABSTRACT 
Mexico’s Federal Ministerial Police (PFM) agency was structured similar to the United 
States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although there have been significant 
reforms within the PFM, it has been ineffective at preventing criminals from 
orchestrating drug trafficking and organized crime. Institutional law enforcement policies 
drive the quality of police officers in an agency, and the policies in Mexico’s PFM 
agency have not been effective to prevent crime. In fact, the Mexican government has 
continued to rely on the military for its public security. Therefore, this thesis analyzes the 
organizational factors that contribute to police effectiveness. It uncovers the institutional 
practices within the FBI to then apply them to those of the PFM. The thesis analyzes 
personnel recruitment policies that feed potential recruits into its training system. It then 
evaluates training and education regimens to identify gaps within the curriculum that can 
be improved upon. This is followed by an examination of career incentives, which 
attempts to lure and retain qualified officers. In addition, institutional oversight is 
assessed because of its potential to control rogue officers and leaders. The thesis 
concludes with an analysis of funding that is invested by domestic and international 
governments and institutions to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement. Based on 
the findings, policies will be recommended. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Mexico’s police institutions have been overwhelmed by the magnitude and 
influence of organized crime.1 In fact, presidents and their administrations have chosen to 
rely on the military instead of the police to combat crime.2 This government strategy has 
hindered police effectiveness and undermined the development of democracy in Mexico.3 
The consequences are evident in the increased number of human rights violations and 
homicide rates, as well as the drug abuse that has spilled into bordering states.4 This 
thesis explores and identifies the smart practices of the FBI that contribute to effective 
policing and attempts to answer the following question: Can these same smart practices 
be applied in Mexico to improve the effectiveness of its law enforcement? 
According to Samuel P. Huntington, strong institutions are necessary for a state to 
uphold democratic principles and to maintain order within a country.5 North American 
democratic governments rely on police institutions to prevent crime and to maintain law 
and order. This thesis explores the strength of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Mexican Federal Ministerial Police (Policía Federal Ministerial—PFM). 
These two federal police organizations share similar characteristics as investigative and 
crime prevention agencies. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United 
States have thus made crime prevention a more important mission to the FBI. This thesis 
assumes that institutional policies within the FBI contribute to police effectiveness. 
                                                
1 Sigrid Artz, “The Militarization of the Procuraduria General de la Republica [Office of the Attorney 
General]: Risks for Mexican Democracy,” in Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico, ed. 
Wayne A. Cornelius and David A. Shirk (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 153. 
2 Arturo Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” in The State of Security in 
Mexico: Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, ed. Brian Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 44. 
3 Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. 
Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 342. 
4 Laurie Freeman and Jorge Luis Sierra, “Mexico: The Militarization Trap,” in Drugs and Democracy 
in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 264; Youngers and Rosin, Drugs and Democracy, 363. 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1968), 4–5. 
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Therefore, it attempts to recommend policies that could increase the effectiveness of 
Mexico’s PFM agency. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The government’s reliance on the military, vis-à-vis the war on drugs, decreased 
citizen security and hindered democratic development in Mexico. Approximately 70,000 
people are believed to have died fighting organized crime over the past six years.6 
Mexican drug cartels have repeatedly exploited corrupt police and government officials. 
In addition, economic progress and public security continue to be undermined by illicit 
drug trafficking and organized crime.7 Moreover, the development of democracy in the 
region is obstructed by the increased violence. 
The decline in citizen security is cause for concern. Statistics shown in Figure 1 
reveal that homicide rates have been rising since 2007. This upward trend significantly 
increased when Mexico began using the military for the war on drugs. In addition, a 
higher homicide rates detracts from the state’s ability to provide citizen security. 
Moreover, the decline in citizen security limits the freedom of people to safe areas “out of 
fear of becoming victims of crime.”8  
                                                
6 Adraina Gomez Licon, “Mexico Drug War: Monument Sparks Debate about How to Mourn 
Victims,” The World Post, updated April 5, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/05/mexico-
drug-war_n_3023732.html. 
7 Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez, “Crime and Violence in Central America: A 
Development Challenge,” The World Bank, 2011, ii–iii. 
8 United Nations Development Report, “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals 





Figure 1.  Evolution of Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Inhabitants, Countries 
with High Rates, Circa 2005–20119 
The concern with a decline in state security is that democratic development is 
hindered. A United Nations report stated that “crime, violence and fear severely limit the 
capabilities and freedoms of people, the way in which they organize their lives in society 
and the way they relate to the state and to other institutions.”10 Furthermore, the state can 
be the source of declining democratic principles. For example, the violations of human 
rights by Mexican authorities, such as “illegal arrests or torture,” are considered 
incompatible with democratic societies.11 
                                                
9 United Nations Development Report, “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals 
for Latin America,” 2. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Niels Uildriks, Mexico’s Unrule of Law: Implementing Human Rights in Police and Judicial Reform 
Under Democratization (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2010), 89. 
 4 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The main problem is that federal law enforcement agencies in Mexico have been 
unable to prevent drug trafficking and organized crime. According to Robert A. Donnelly 
and David A. Shirk: 
The problem with Mexican law enforcement is rooted in institutional 
factors practically guarantee [sic] that police will not only fail to 
adequately serve the public, but will become a menace to society. From 
the outset, police are poorly trained and equipped, underpaid, and subject 
to an incentive system that leads naturally down a twisted path of extortion 
and corruption.12 
Moreover, the ineffectiveness of federal law enforcement agency to combat crime 
has prompted the government to increase its reliance on the military. The risks to civilian 
control of the government are greater with the military at center of the nation’s war on 
drugs. The other problem in Mexico is that corruption has rooted itself within public 
security institutions that often lead to violations of the rule of law. 
The militarization of public security in Latin America has often resulted in more 
violence in the region. Militarization is defined by Jorge Saverucha as “a process of 
adoption and use of military models, methods, concepts, doctrines, procedures, and 
personnel in police activities, thus giving a military character to public safety (and public 
space).”13 Militarization generates an insecurity dilemma, a predicament in which groups 
operating to prevent violence only exacerbate the problem by creating increased threats 
and insecurity within a country’s borders.14  
The severity of the problem is illustrated by the government’s increased reliance 
on the military to provide public and domestic security.15 The deployment of military 
                                                
12 Robert A. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, “Police and Public Security in Mexico,” Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C., accessed January 3, 2014, 16, http://seguridadpublica.cide.edu/ 
documents/130662/131312/Police%20and%20Public%20Security%20in%20Mexico.%20Robert%20Donn
elly%20and%20David%20A.%20Shirk?version=1.0&t=1355278250000. 
13 Jorge Zaverucha, “Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil,” Latin 
American Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2000): 8, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634079. 
14 Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” 43. 
15 Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, “Public Security and Police Reform in Mexico,” in Public Security and 
Police Reform in the Americas, ed. John Bailey and Lucia Dammert (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 179–180. 
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units to perform policing functions strongly suggests that Mexico’s law enforcement 
institutions are unable to provide security for citizens. The government continues to rely 
on the military instead of the police to combat organized crime.16 On the one hand, Sigrid 
Arzt postulates that Mexico’s public security institutions have been “overtaxed by the 
fight in organized crime.”17 On the other hand, the military has been successful against 
drug trafficking. In January 2007, the military deployed 7,000 soldiers to the state of 
Guerrero to combat drug-related violence, as shown in Table 1.18 
 
STATE MONTH TROOPS 
 
Michoacán Dec-06 6,700 
 
Baja California Jan-07 3,300 
 
Guerrero Jan-07 7,000 




Nuevo León and Tamaulipas Feb-07 3,600 
 
Veracruz May-07 1,200 
 
Nuevo Leon Jun-07 1,600 
 
Tamaulipas Feb-08 n.a. 
 
Chihuahua Mar-08 2,500 
 
Baja California Oct-08 150 
 
Note: Chihuahua received two separate deployments of 2,000 and 500 federal troops in 
March 2008. 
Table 1.   Approximation of Troop Deployments in Mexico19 
In Mexico, the military continues to gain political support in public security 
matters while the police are falling behind. The military operates with impunity and like 
                                                
16 Moloeznik, “Public Security and Police Reform in Mexico,” 179–180. 
17 Artz, “The Militarization of the Procuraduria General de la Republica,” 153. 
18 Robert A. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, Police and Public Security in Mexico (San Diego, CA: 
University Readers, 2010), 29.  
19 Donnelly and Shirk, “Police and Public Security in Mexico,” 22–23. 
 6 
many other Latin American states, Mexico does not have sufficient civilian oversight.20 
For instance, now that the military is at the center of the war on drugs, civilians have less 
control over public security. For example, presidents in Mexico have appointed more 
military officers to the head of the Office of the Attorney General. The heightened 
involvement of the military in civilian affairs poses a real risk to civilian control.21 
Mexico continues to strengthen the Procuraduría General de la República (Office 
of the Attorney General—PGR) with military leaders who prefer military tactics.22 The 
militarization of the PGR is cause for grave concern because the PFM falls under its 
command.23 Furthermore, militarization detracts power from civilian control and enables 
the military to gather political sway in domestic affairs. Thus, democratic institutions 
require strong oversight to prevent other forms of government, such as authoritarianism, 
to take hold.24  
Providing police institutions with superior quality law enforcement officers 
improve their ability to stymie drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and helps 
strengthen government control. Mark Ungar posits that without quality control, more 
crime suspects are slain, the quality of reports declines, promotion issues arise, and 
administrative demands draw energy away from law enforcement.25 In addition, 
“educational shortcomings harm policing by limiting officers’ abilities to detect the 
causes of crime, to adapt to changing situations, and to convince their superiors to 
incorporate new ideas about police work in policy.”26 However, unless more 
accountability occurs within Mexico’s justice system, a stronger effective police force 
                                                




24 James F. Hodgson and Catherine Orban, Public Policing in the 21st Century: Issues and Dilemmas 
in the U.S. and Canada (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2005), 13. 
25 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America 
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 37. 
26 Ibid., 39. 
7 
may actually contribute to more injustices.27 Justice and order are the two conditions to 
ensure that society follows the rule of law. Hence, a strong police force unsupported by 
the justice system cannot be an effective security institution.28 
Government corruption poses an ancillary threat to Mexico’s democratic progress. 
Many federal officials, including high-ranking leaders, seem unable to resist bribes. For 
example, in September 1995, Chief of the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) Rodolfo Leon 
Aragon delivered US$2 million to Deputy Attorney General Javier Coello Trejo in 
exchange for the release of cartel leader Amado Carillo.29 This policing failure stems 
from a corrupt government system in which officials do not fear repercussions when 
dealing with DTOs and cartels. In fact, police officials assist cartel hit squads in escaping 
to safety zones. For instance, in an opening statement before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations at the World Policy Institute, Andrew A. Reding stated that the PJF 
sheltered an Arellano Felix hit squad that had gunned down Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas 
Ocampo inside a Guadalajara airport.30 Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, a large 
majority of Mexicans believed the police participated in criminal activities. According to 
Stephen D. Morris:  
Headlines periodically feature the arrest or detention of top officials within 
agencies spearheading the fight against drugs and organized crime (a 
federal responsibility); port and prison officials; military and police 
commanders; governors and gubernatorial candidates; state police, 
investigators, and district attorneys; mayors and city officials; and 
hundreds of municipal police, all for essentially aiding and abetting 
organized crime. For example, in November 2008, during the high profile 
Operación Limpieza (Operation Clean House), six members of SIEDO 
(Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia 
Organizada), the attorney general’s office in charge of investigating and 
prosecuting organized crime, the head of the Mexican office of Interpol, 
directors of the federal police, and close associates of the secretary of 
public security were arrested for their ties to the Beltrán Leyva cartel. Noé 
27 Donnelly and Shirk, “Police and Public Security in Mexico,” 36. 
28 Ibid., 26. 
29 Ibid., 106. 
30 Andrew A. Reding, “The Drug Trade in Mexico and U.S. Policy Implications,” World Policy 
Institute, August 8, 1995, http://www.worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/uploaded/image/Senate-1995-
Political%20corruption%20and%20drug%20trafficking%20in%20Mexico.pdf.  
8 
Ramírez, the former director of SIEDO, reportedly received $450,000 per 
month for his services to the cartel’s leaders.31 
Public perception of police participation in criminal 
Figure 2.  Public Perception (in percent) of Police Participation in Criminal 
Activities, Latin America, 201232 
Preliminary research has shown that PFM structures are similar to and often 
modeled after those of the FBI. The hypothesis examined pays particular attention to the 
U.S. FBI and Mexico PFM law enforcement organizational structures. Therefore, this 
thesis analyzes five key factors, shown in Table 2, that are in poor condition but that may 
contribute to effective policing in Mexico: personnel recruitment, training and education, 
career incentives, institutional oversight, and funding.33 These factors are critical to the 
31 Stephen D. Morris, “Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico,” Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 18, no. 11 (Spring 2012): 30. http://www.mtsu.edu/politicalscience/faculty/documents/ 
Corruption%20Brown%20article%20Morris.pdf. 
32 United Nations Development Report, “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals 
for Latin America,” 9. 
33 Luis V. De la Torre, “Drug Trafficking and Police Corruption a Comparison of Colombia and 
Mexico,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4074, 106. 
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performance of law enforcement officers because they are essential in developing an 
effective organization.  
 
Table 2.   Summary of Factors Accounting for Different Levels of Drug-
Related Police Corruption within the Mexican and Colombian 
Police Forces34 
                                                
34 De la Torre, “Drug Trafficking and Police Corruption a Comparison of Colombia and Mexico,” 
106. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature that focused on federal law enforcement surveyed the Federal Police 
(Policía Federal—PF) or the Mexican Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la 
República—PGR) but rarely did it discuss the PFM organization. Moreover, this 
literature does not elaborate on the organizational capacity-building factors or policies 
that contribute to effective policing. Therefore, this thesis attempts to fill this gap by 
evaluating personnel recruitment, training and education, career path, institutional 
oversight, and funding of the FBI and PFM. Isolating this paper’s analytical framework 
to North America ensures that the research is focused and geopolitically relevant for 
policy development. 
A. PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT 
Police officers are at the core function of law enforcement. For this reason, 
understanding the methods used to recruit them are important. According to Dwayne W. 
Orrick, “Crafting the ‘ideal’ candidate should be tied closely to organizational goals and 
mission and help establish criteria the department will use to hire.”35 This approach is 
useful in the recruitment process because it takes the mission and goals of the agency into 
account. This mission-oriented framework ensures that only qualified candidates who 
meet institutionally supported criteria are employed, which is especially important for 
federal law enforcement agencies that desire specialized agents to investigate and prevent 
crime. 
Other recruiting methods propose using the human resource perspective to select 
individuals based on recruiting practices. Literature on police administration processes 
recommend that applicants be selected based on recruiting practices. For example, the 
California Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission recommends that agencies 
develop recruitment plans that include the goals of the organization, community 
                                                
35 Jeremy M. Wilson, Erin Dalton, Charles Scheer, and Clifford A. Grammich, Police Recruitment and 
Retention for the New Millennium (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2010), 70. 
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demographics, the number of officers needed, and skills and diversity it desires.36 This 
recruitment model complements Orrick’s mission-oriented framework for recruiting 
officers. 
Law enforcement experts argued for increased recruitment of college-educated 
applicants. Officers with a college degree have shown to be a tremendous asset to police 
organizations. According to Charles R. Swanson, Leonard Territo, and Robert W. Taylor, 
college education has been linked to the “professionalization of policing” and should be 
considered in the recruiting plan.37  
Furthermore, recruitment practices may determine the viability of potential 
recruits. For example, it is recommended that applicants undergo physical assessment 
tests, a background investigation, and an evaluation of character, a lie detector test, and 
medical examinations in both physical and mental health.38 These additional 
requirements help scrutinize applicants who cannot perform the ardent task of a police 
officer. 
B. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
The extent to which officers undergo training matters because institutions expect 
officers to codify policing practices into their behavior. According to Dennis J. Stevens, 
“training is designed to change a candidate’s behavior, provide alternative solutions in 
problems and confrontations, and persuade a candidate to assume values and ideals of the 
department that employs him or her.”39 Training provides recruits with a practical way to 
implement knowledge, while “education is [the] sharing [of] [that] knowledge.”40 
Training involves change. Steven argues that nothing is learned until it has “changed or 
36 Charles R. Swanson, Leonard Territo, and Robert W. Taylor, Police Administration; Structures, 
Processes, and Behavior, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012), 380. 
37 Ibid., 382. 
38 Ibid., 382–389. 




influenced you.”41 More importantly, “Little is considered truly ‘learned’ until the 
expected behavior becomes institutionalized, automatic, and routine.”42 Police who have 
“learned” the skills necessary in dealing with citizens means that they do not have to 
resort to brutality.43 
Training is a necessary part of law enforcement. Rules and laws continually 
change, which need to be addressed and understood by police officers. Therefore, the 
level of training along with frequency is necessary for an effective police force. Experts 
who have studied entry-level police training find that effective training should reduce the 
number of police confrontations when dealing with disputes. According to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Relations Service, police training “should be 
conducted in environments simulating the ‘complex, and often bewildering, conditions in 
which deadly force episodes take place.” Moreover, training should be focused on the 
development of “a ‘thinking police officer’ who analyzes situations and responds in the 
appropriate manner based upon a value system” that the officer has gained from the 
institution.”44 
A 2002 report on police education found that “officers with degrees had fewer 
complaints filed against them, made better decisions, or were generally higher quality 
officers.”45 Another study on disciplinary cases against officers in Florida showed that 
only 11 percent held a four-year degree (see Figure 3).46 Other researchers have found 
41 Ibid. 
42 Stevens, An Introduction to American Policing, 269. 
43 Uildriks, Mexico’s Unrule of Law: Implementing Human Rights in Police and Judicial Reform 
Under Democratization, 201. 
44 Community Relations Office, “Principles of Good Policing: Avoiding Violence Between Police and 
Citizens,” Department of Justice, 2003, 29, http://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgood 
policingfinal092003.pdf.  
45 C. Wayne Johnston and Sutham Cheurprakobkit, “Educating Our Police: Perceptions of Police 
Administrators Regarding the Utility of a College Education, Police Academy Training and Preferences in 
Courses for Officers,” National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2002, https://www.ncjrs.gov/app/ 
publications/abstract.aspx?ID=197615. 
46 Stevens, An Introduction to American Policing, 260. 
 14 
that officers with college degrees were less likely to end their career by involuntarily 
separating.47 
 
Figure 3.  Separated and Control Officers’ Educational Levels at Entry to the 
NYPD48 
C. CAREER PATH 
A career path refers to the process in which police agencies retain high-caliber 
experienced officers. This process incentivizes the officer to remain in service for as long 
as possible. This thesis focuses on compensation factors within this process, such as 
salary potential, promotion opportunities, and retirement compensation. 
Salaries or monetary compensation provides law enforcement officers with an 
exchangeable good. It is tangible and easier to exchange for other goods and services. 
“As Christopher Lee (2006, p. 53) notes, pay is usually a symptom of other things not 
going well. When employees complain about pay, they are usually indirectly indicating 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 James J. Fyfe and Robert Kane, “Bad Cops: A Study of Career-Ending Misconduct Among New 
York City Police Officers,” U.S. Department of Justice, 264, September 2006, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/215795.pdf. 
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that they are not happy with their work situation. Pay is a lightning rod issue as it is more 
tangible than poor management and lack of appreciation.”49 
When pay is inadequate, officers in positions of power are more susceptible to 
bribery and corruption, and depend on it as a form of supplemental income.50 For 
example from 1995 to 2000, the Zedillo administration in Mexico “fired hundreds of drug 
agents for accepting bribes.”51 Moreover, many law enforcement officers at every rank 
consider low wages the issue that justifies corruption.52 
According to Swanson Territo, and Taylor, law enforcement executives have a 
disparity dilemma between the number of available promotions and the number of well-
qualified candidates. This disparity is reduced because some candidates do not participate 
in promotion tests because a promotion usually means they have to relocate. Doctrine 
does not allow promoted officers to lead those whom they worked with as equals.53 
Promotions are supposed to reward the performance of officers but very little is 
understood about police promotions in Latin America. According to Ungar, Latin 
American promotion systems are “not based on a critical evaluation of positive actions or 
specific skill development. Instead, it depends almost entirely on the officer’s seniority, 
academy exam score, ranking, and whether he or she has caused any problems.”54 In 
addition, very little police work is taken into consideration for promotion. Moreover, 
many officers make promotion leaps in the system because of favoritism.55 As shown, the 
Latin American promotion system leaves much to be desired. More often than not, 
promotions systems like these only limit the capability of law enforcement officers to 
prevent crime. 
                                                
49 Wilson et al., Police Recruitment, 38. 
50 De la Torre, “Drug Trafficking and Police Corruption a Comparison of Colombia and Mexico,” 83. 
51 Uildriks, Mexico’s Unrule of Law: Implementing Human Rights in Police and Judicial Reform 
Under Democratization 94. 
52 Donnelly and Shirk, Police and Public Security in Mexico, 126–127. 
53 Swanson, Territo, and Taylor, Police Administration, 408–409. 
54 Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America, 39; 
Donnelly and Shirk, “Police and Public Security in Mexico,” 131–133. 
55 Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America, 39. 
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Retirement pensions are viewed as a key component of an effective organization 
because it provides an end-goal or reward to officers at the end of their public service. 
However, very few authors have studied law enforcement retirement compensation in 
Latin America. To some, retirement is a method of strategically removing officers who 
tend to corrode the formation of a new organization.56 This thesis provides a small 
contribution to the knowledge of retirement compensation by analyzing the FBI pension 
practices and those of the PFM, which is especially important because most law 
enforcement officers fail to plan for retirement.57 Retirement compensation may be part 
of an applicant’s consideration especially in Latin America where officers have 
historically earned low wages for an often-risky public security job. 
D. INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT 
Of all the literature reviewed, most authors emphasize institutional oversight as a 
critical factor to an effective trustworthy organization. Advocates of civilian oversight 
argue that it empowers citizens with confidence to question the use of force.58 Moreover, 
external review of police actions allows for trust in the police to take root. According to 
Charles Perrow, author of complex organizations, the effectiveness of civilian oversight 
depends on several factors, such as “the agency’s definition of its role, its resources, the 
quality of its staff, and the degree of political support it receives from the community.”59 
Niels Uildriks relies on several studies that reveal the need for institutional internal 
control. Without them, police would resort to violence and succumb to corruption.60 
Opposing arguments complain that civilian oversight “is expensive and duplicates 
the work of internal affairs.”61 In addition, concern exists that civilian oversight intrudes 
                                                
56 Frank Harris, “The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform,” Department of Police Education 
and Development, 42, 2005, http://polis.osce.org/library/f/2643/527/OSCE-SRB-RPT-2643-EN-527. 
57 Swanson, Territo, and Taylor, Police Administration, 418. 
58 Ibid., 152–153. 
59 Uildriks, Mexico’s Unrule of Law: Implementing Human Rights in Police and Judicial Reform 
Under Democratization, 153. 
60 Ibid., 16. 
61 Swanson, Territo, and Taylor, Police Administration, 152. 
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on the professional independence of the police. Furthermore, external reviewers are not 
qualified to assess the practices and procedures of the police.62 
An Internal Affairs (IA) section presents an option to external civilian oversight. 
The reviewing officer is the police auditor whose role it is to “audit and monitor the 
operations of the police department.”63 The auditor then provides recommendations for 
changes to policies. 
E. FUNDING  
Finally, police effectiveness may increase with properly funded programs, as 
shown by success in other North American law enforcement agencies like the FBI. 
However, reshaping institutions to mimic those of other nations may take more than just 
a reshuffle of the organization or an increased budget. Peter F. Drucker postulates that 
institutions also need a systemic approach to administration to make them perform.64 In 
one of Drucker’s recommendations for success, he states: 
Service institutions need to derive clear objectives and goals from their 
definition of function and mission. What they need is not ‘better people’ 
but people who do [sic] the management job systematically and who focus 
themselves and their institutions purposefully on performance and results. 
They do need efficiency—that is, control of costs. But, above all, they 
need effectiveness—that is, emphasis on the right results.65 
Drucker argues that management experience and a systematic approach increases 
the effectiveness of an institution. He further states that creating an organization of 
people adept at reaching performance objectives ensures the institution can reach its 
institutional goals.66 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Swanson, Territo, and Taylor, Police Administration, 152. 
64 Peter F. Drucker, “Managing the Public Service Institution,” National Affairs, no. 33 (1973): 59, 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20080527_197303302managingthepublicserviceinstitutionpeterfdru
cker.pdf. 
65 Ibid., 58. 
66 Ibid. 
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Donnelly and Shirk posit that Mexican law enforcement institutions are 
significantly limited and dysfunctional, and that more investment needs to be done than 
merely promoting greater police effectiveness.67 Institutional investment in law 
enforcement processes, like the five organizational factors this thesis intends to examine, 
is just one solution that may increase the effectiveness of Mexico’s federal law 
enforcement agencies. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes organizational factors that make up the police institution, 
such as personnel recruitment, training and education, career path, institutional oversight, 
and funding. It analyzes law enforcement agencies in the United States and Mexico by 
first understanding the five factors that contribute to effectiveness. Chapter I begins with 
a brief overview of the law enforcement problem and provides an overview of the five 
factors effectiveness. Chapter II analyzes the five institutional factors within the U.S.’ 
FBI to identify the organizational policies that have garnered a reputation as an effective 
law enforcement organization. Chapter III examines the institutional capacity and 
organizational factors of the PFM in Mexico. An analysis of this federal agency will help 
determine if the factors of effectiveness analyzed prior in Chapter II can be applied or 
improved upon to the PFM in Mexico. Last, the thesis ends with a brief summary and 
conclusion of what was learned, and recommendations are offered that may increase the 
effectiveness of Mexico’s federal law enforcement agency. 
The information researched encompasses sources within literature, such as current 
and past historical documents, edited works, and institutional reports. The U.S. 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reports are utilized to provide a baseline for assessing this thesis. Various Internet 
sources in the United States and Mexico, including those written in Spanish, are also 
reviewed. For raw statistical data, this thesis analyzes a variety of trusted international 
organizations, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, Transparency International, 
and Justice in Mexico websites among others. 
                                                
67 Donnelly and Shirk, “Police and Public Security in Mexico,” 36. 
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The thesis first defines and explains organizational factors of effectiveness to 
ensure a consistent conceptualization of the topic followed by an analysis into the 
effectiveness of the U.S. FBI and Mexican PFM law enforcement agencies. The resulting 
evidence will help determine institutional variances among federal law enforcement 
agencies. The similarities and differences can, therefore, be used to illustrate contributing 
factors of effectiveness among North American federal law enforcement agencies and 
then applied to the case in Mexico. 
 20 
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III. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
The FBI is considered one of the most powerful and effective federal law 
enforcement agencies in the world.68 It has been recognized by local, state, and foreign 
agencies as the training model for effective law enforcement.69 As will be mentioned 
later, Mexico’s PFM aspires to become an effective and capable institution structured like 
the FBI. Hence, an examination of the FBI that focuses on the five factors of 
effectiveness will be useful in providing recommendations to policy makers and the 
PFM. The five factors reviewed are personnel recruitment, training and education, career 
path, institutional oversight, and funding. 
A. BACKGROUND  
The Bureau of Investigation was created on July 26, 1908 after Attorney General 
Charles J. Bonaparte and President Theodore Roosevelt determined the need for a special 
investigative force.70 The reformist generation of this era believed that a federal agency 
would ensure justice within an industrial society.71 Initially, it consisted of 35 agents 
tasked to investigate crimes involving bankruptcy fraud, antitrust, neutrality violations, 
peonage, and law violations on Indian reservations.72 At the onset, special agents were 
poorly trained, ill-experienced at enforcing law, and often accused of violating civil 
rights.73 
Law enforcement agents were overwhelmed and ineffective against criminal 
gangster during what are known as the lawless 1920s and 1930s. Gangsters terrorized 
                                                
68 National Cable Satellite Corporation, “The FBI: Inside the World’s Most Powerful Law 
Enforcement Agency,” Booknotes, September 12, 1993, http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/50306-
1/Ronald+Kessler.aspx.  
69 Kenneth W. Lucas, Federal Law Enforcement Badges (Takoma, MD: Kenneth W. Lucas, 1991), 
107. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “A Brief History of the FBI,” accessed June 12, 2014, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/brief-history.  
72 Ibid. 
73 Lucas, Federal Law Enforcement Badges, 108. 
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many communities with their powerful and well-armed groups. These criminals often 
fled across state lines where local and state police were unable to cross jurisdictions, 
which therefore, provided an advantage to criminals and made apprehension difficult. 
Affected communities began to lose trust in the ability of the agency. Rising violent 
conditions forced Herbert Hoover to expand the bureau’s capacity in deterring crime to 
“gain legitimacy and authority in society.”74  
In 1924, J. Edgar Hoover was appointed Director of the Bureau and pushed for 
reforms to ensure the bureau would become an efficient crime-fighting force. Director 
Hoover had enormous ambitions that brought in a new era of policing that extended 
beyond minor investigations. One of the most significant improvements was to establish 
and consolidate the nation’s first fingerprint data repository. This storehouse helped bring 
the strength of collection and analysis to the forefront, which enabled the bureau to 
become a full-fledged investigative agency. In addition, Hoover expanded its capability 
of data analysis by establishing the first scientific forensic data analysis laboratory of its 
time.75 
The bureau continued to increase its authority with the support of Congress. The 
bureau’s tough disciplinary code of conduct and an increasing rise in crime provided the 
rational for political support. In 1934, Congress passed the Fugitive Felon’s Act, which 
significantly increased the bureau’s jurisdiction and increased protection for special 
agents.76 The act made it a felony to flee from prosecution or from providing testimony. 
The bureau was renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation on July 1, 1935.77 In 1961, 
the FBI’s responsibilities expanded again to prevent and reduce money laundering and 
racketeering operations of organized criminal syndicates.78 In addition, during World 
War II, espionage by Germany prompted another expansion of the FBI’s intelligence and 
surveillance capabilities. 
                                                
74 Lucas, Federal Law Enforcement Badges, 108. 
75 Ibid., 109. 
76 Ibid., 110. 
77 Ibid., 107. 
78 Ibid., 115. 
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1. Mission 
FBI reforms played a significant role in how the agency’s mission has evolved. 
Since its establishment in 1908, the bureau’s mission grew from a 35-agent force to more 
than 14,000 special agents. Today, much of the FBI’s authority derives from Title 28 of 
the United States Code (U.S. Code), Section 533, which legally mandates the 
establishment of the FBI and delineates its responsibility.79 Margaret E. Beare explains 
that the FBI’s current role in conducting intelligence activities pertains to “domestic and 
transnational criminal networks that are capable of threatening national security, 
including criminal enterprises, terrorist organizations, weapons proliferators, and foreign 
intelligence services.”80 Given the complex role of the FBI, it is no surprise that its end 
goal is to protect and defend the country from internal and external threats and to enforce 
federal laws.81 
Another aspect of its mission pertains to the sharing of intelligence with other 
agencies. The FBI provides intelligence collection to the director of national intelligence. 
The attorney general and the director of national intelligence jointly manage the law 
enforcement and intelligence roles of the FBI.82 Furthermore, like the PFM in Mexico, 
the FBI provides the Department of Justice (DOJ) with investigative and intelligence 
evidence to support the prosecution of criminals.83 
2. Organizational Structures 
The FBI’s multi-layer command structure ensures that rogue agents are less likely 
to violate the institution’s policies that help protect agents and the public. The FBI has an 
established hierarchical structure that clearly defines the chain of command (CoC) and 
                                                
79 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed June 11, 2014, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/faqs.  
80 Margaret E. Beare, Encyclopedia of Transnational Crime and Justice (Los Angeles, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2012), 197. 
81 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “What We Investigate,” accessed June 8, 2014, http://www.fbi. 
gov/about-us/investigate/what_we_investigate. 
82 Department of Justice, “Today’s FBI: Fact and Figures 2013–2014,” 5, March 14, 2013, 
http://www0.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/todays-fbi-facts-figures/facts-and-figures-031413.pdf/view. 
83 Beare, Encyclopedia of Transnational Crime and Justice, 200. 
24 
outlines its reporting responsibilities. The top authority figure can thereby delegate tasks 
and missions to subordinates.84 Furthermore, each layer of command reports to someone 
who the government can hold accountable for the actions of the institution. 
a. The FBI Chain of Command
Understanding the FBI’s command structure is important because the internal 
interactions of a law enforcement agency provide a clearer insight to how the 
organization operates. Table 3 shows how the FBI is organized. 
Table 3.   The FBI Organizational Chart85 
84 Swanson, Territo, and Taylor, Police Administration; Structures, Processes, and Behavior, 221. 
85 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Organizational Chart,” January 20, 2010, http://www.fbi.gov/ 
contact-us/fbi-headquarters/org_chart/organizational_chart. 
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The FBI director is first appointed by the president and then confirmed by the 
Senate. Each director cannot serve more than 10 years or one term.86 Under the 
supervision of the Deputy Director, special agents in charge (SACs) provide guidance to 
the director on matters of interest to the public and congress, as well as on matters of 
internal concerns, such as professionalism, integrity and compliance.87 Much like the 
support staff for a commanding general, SACs keep the director apprised of internally or 
externally influential situations that affect the FBI’s mission. The deputy director is also 
responsible for three other branches. First, the national security branch provides 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence, and 
analysis products to top leaders. Second, the cyber, response, and services branch 
encompasses a criminal investigative division, a cyber division, the critical incident 
response group (CIRG), the international operations division, and an office of law 
enforcement coordination. Third, the science and technology branch combines an 
operational technology division, a laboratory division, and a criminal justice information 
services division.88 
The FBI associate deputy director reports to the deputy director and supervises the 
information technology (IT) branch, the human resources branch, and four other 
administrative divisions. The IT branch manages, engineers, and provides technological 
services to the FBI force. The human resource branch hires and administers the FBI 
training program. The other four divisions, under the supervision of the associate 
director, provide administrative, logistical, financial, security, and record management 
support to the entire agency. Furthermore, the associate director is responsible for 
overseeing the office of resource planning and the inspection division.89 
                                                
86 Department of Justice, “Today’s FBI: Fact and Figures 2013–2014,” 24. 
87 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Headquarters,” accessed June 11, 2014, https://www.fbijobs. 
gov/3111.asp.  
88 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Organizational Chart.” 
89 Ibid. 
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B. PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT 
1. Employment
The FBI’s increased mission load has required the increased the employment of 
specialty focused officers. These specialized or support staffs outnumber special agents 
by more than half. However, support staffs are essential to special agents who need data 
analysis to help build cases for the prosecution of criminals. The tragic events of 
September 11, 2001 propelled the FBI to increase its number of employees. As Table 4 
demonstrates, it employed 14,690 special agents in the year 2001. In 2012, the DOJ 
revealed that the FBI had a total of 36,074 active employees; the highest number in its 
history.90 In October 31, 2013, the FBI reported that it decreased the number of 
employees to 35,344.91 Of those currently working with the FBI, some 13,598 are special 
agents, and another 21,746 are support professionals (intelligence analysts, language 
specialists, scientists, IT specialists, and other professionals).92 Statistics show the 
number of FBI employees and their specialties have increased in response to the FBI’s 
evolving mission. 
90 Department of Justice, “Today’s FBI: Fact and Figures 2013–2014,” 9. 






Table 4.   The Bureau—Employment History93 
2. Recruitment 
The FBI scrutinizes applications to ensure only the best available candidates enter 
its force. With the exception of military veterans who may apply for age waivers, the FBI 
accepts applications from candidates between the ages of 23 and 37. To be a special agent 
recruit, applicants must be citizens of the United States or of the commonwealth of the 
                                                
93 Department of Justice, “Today’s FBI: Fact and Figures 2013–2014,” 9. 
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Northern Mariana Islands.94 The intents may provide recruits who are apt to be loyal to 
the United States. The FBI is thereby increasing its effectiveness. Applicants must also 
possess a four-year college or university degree from an accredited institution. In 
addition, the FBI expects applicants to have worked for three years in some professional 
capacity. Applicants must also possess a valid driver’s license. Persons who have been 
convicted of a felony or have a defaulted government-insured student loan may not apply. 
Candidates must be able to pass a comprehensive background investigation that involves 
social and economic assessments, illegal drug tests, and a polygraph.95 The FBI has 
shown a desire to recruit responsible and trustworthy individuals by being very diligent in 
the recruiting process. The diagram in Figure 4 depicts the process of an application, 
which takes over a year to complete.96 The FBI clearly has a very rigid and effective way 
of tracking recruits through the application process and the option of selecting only those 
applicants who meet the FBI’s stringent criteria. 
                                                
94 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Special Agent Qualification Requirements,” accessed May 9, 
2014, https://www.fbijobs.gov/111.asp. 
95 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Background Investigation,” accessed June 8, 2014, https:// 
www.fbijobs.gov/5.asp. 
96 David M. Walker, “FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major 




Figure 4.  FBI Hiring Process for Special Agent Positions97 
                                                
97 Walker, “FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges 
Continue,” 38. 
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C. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
1. Special Agent Trainees 
Training provides officers the necessary tools and knowledge that helps contribute 
to policing effectiveness. An FBI recruit begins learning the basics of law enforcement 
throughout a 20-week course located in Quantico, Virginia.98 This 800-hour course 
focuses on “four major concentrations: academics, case exercises, firearms training, and 
operational skills.”99 After basic training is completed, recruits must learn the technical 
and legal aspects of the law. The curriculum entails skills in the “fundamentals of law, 
ethics, behavioral science, interviewing and report writing, basic and advanced 
investigative and intelligence techniques, interrogation, and forensic science.”100 The 
integration of this core curriculum provides recruits with a value-based law enforcement 
framework in which to investigate and apprehend criminals. The Quantico training site 
has its own “mock city” called Hogan’s Alley at which recruits can practice role-based 
scenarios. Recruits are also presented with real life case scenarios that provide additional 
pragmatic approaches to a variety of situations in which to utilize basic skills and 
academic training by performing simulated investigations.101 
The two most important instructions that trainees receive are the use of firearms 
and operational skills. Recruits go through a live-fire exercise to learn to handle a bureau-
issued pistol, carbine, and shotgun. Once agents have successfully qualified with their 
weapons, they transition into operational skill training. The FBI academy provides these 
skills through a variety of tactical, technical, and administrative courses. For example, 
recruits will practice self-defense techniques, learn how to conduct surveillance, practice 
apprehension methods, and attend a driving school. During this phase, instructors 
evaluate trainees as they perform in these real-live scenarios and in virtual simulator 
environments. Senior agents, called field counselors, are also integrated into the academy 
                                                






during several phases of courses to enhance the trainees’ experience and prepare them to 
serve as a special agent.102 Moreover, trainees must maintain their physical and mental 
abilities throughout the courses, as they are required to pass a physical-fitness test. 
Statistical data provided by the FBI in Figure 5 attest to the FBI’s training 
regimen. In 2012, the FBI experienced a 66.6 percent criminal conviction rate for every 
apprehension by it. As depicted by Figure 5, the report also revealed that more criminal 
investigators were employed in law enforcement than other areas of police 
responsibility.103 
 
Figure 5.  Federal Officers by Primary Function104 
The FBI has been an influential agency in training law enforcement executives to 
manage their local and state police forces. Since October 2001, the FBI has trained 
60,400 law enforcement officers worldwide.105 It reports training 46,082 executive-level 
investigative officers from local and state law enforcement agencies. In addition, the FBI 
trained 394 upper-level executives (chiefs and deputy chiefs) at local agencies in 
                                                
102 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “New Agent Training.” 
103 Brian A. Reaves, “Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” U.S. Department of Justice, 1, June 
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counterterrorism. Of the 150 largest U.S. law enforcement agencies, an estimated 1,200 
executives were trained at the FBI’s National Executive Institute (NEI) to help them with 
management responsibilities.106 In addition, 257 federal executives and fortune 1,000 
corporate security executives have been trained on domestic security. Some 2,750 
additional police chiefs, with less than 500 police officers in their force, were also 
trained. Finally, the FBI trained 9,717 international police managers at various 
institutional locations.107 Evidently, many law enforcement agencies revere the FBI as a 
model of police effectiveness. 
D. CAREER PATH 
1. Salary Compensation 
Salaries are an important part of an agent’s career path because it presents an 
obstacle to corruption. The federal government utilizes a general schedule (GS) to pay 
employees. New special agents start at level 10 step one and earn an average salary of 
$43,441 dollars and are also allotted an additional locality pay, which is dependent upon 
the assignment location.108 In addition, because agents are expected to work an average 
of 50 hours per week, they are compensated with an availability pay that consists of 25 
percent of their base salary. After considering all entitlements, a new agent can expect to 
be earn anywhere from $61,100 to $69,900.109 Special agents are given the opportunity 
to advance to grade level GS-13 in field or non-supervisory assignments. Agents selected 
to supervisory, management, and/or executive positions may reach even higher-grade 
levels up to GS-14, GS-15, and Senior Executive Service pay grades, as indicated in 
Tables 5 and 6.110 FBI agents are able to reach high levels of responsibility, and are 
adequately compensated. This compensation is important because corruption within the 
force can be reduced or prevented by properly compensating employees for their work. 
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Table 5.   General Schedule for Federal Employees, 2014111 
 
Table 6.   Service Executive Schedule, 2014112 
2. Medical Compensation 
FBI agents are medically compensated for their service using the most 
comprehensive medical system the U.S. government can provide to federal employees. 
FBI employees are offered medical coverage plans under the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits (FEHB) program. The FEHB offers over 270 health plans ranging from standard 
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fee-for-service (FFS), preferred provider organizations (PPO), to health maintenance 
organizations (HMO).113 Federal employees can add dependents to their health care plans 
by sharing their health care costs with the government. After retirement, health care rates 
may remain the same as when on active status as long as the employee was enrolled in 
the plan five years prior to retirement.114 Providing agents with sufficient medical care 
enhances morale and increases the likelihood that employees will stay. 
3. Retirement Compensation 
According to DOJ fiscal year (FY) 2013 statistics, the FBI retirement system 
provides coverage to employees with one of three plans. The first plan considers the 
aging group of workers employed prior to January 1, 1984. These aging employees are 
covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Under the CSRS, “the FBI 
contributes 7.0 percent of the support employees’ gross pay for normal retirement and 
[sic] 7.5 percent for law enforcement officers’ retirement.”115 The second plan covers 
employees hired after January 1, 1984 and prior to December 31, 2012. The employees 
who fall under this category are covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System 
(FERS). Under FERS, FBI support-role employees receive 11.9 percent of their gross 
pay, while law enforcement agents receive a 26.3 percent contribution to their retirement 
account.116 Third, FBI employees hired on January 1, 2013 and beyond fall under the 
FERS-Revised Annuity Employee system (FERS-RAE). Under the FERS-RAE, the FBI 
contributes less than the previous system but more than the first retirement plan offered 
prior to January 1, 1984. Under the FERS-RAE retirement system, FBI support-role staff 
receives 9.6 percent of their gross pay. Law enforcement agents receive 24.0 percent of 
their gross pay in FBI contributions.117 Furthermore, FBI employees who fall under 
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either the FERS or FERS-RAE retirement plans are allowed to contribute to the Federal 
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), which is automatically initiated upon employment. The TSP is 
a federal retirement system similar to a corporate 401-K plan and thus allows the 
investment of retirement contributions into six optional funds, as illustrated in Table 7.118 
The FBI is required to contribute an additional 1.0 percent to an employee’s TSP and 
must match employee TSP contributions up to a maximum of 4.0 percent.119 As of year 
2014, FBI employees under FERS can contribute a maximum of $17,500 dollars to their 
TSP fund.120  
FBI employees can begin collecting full retirement benefits after 20 years of 
service. In 2012, the average federal employee received a $32,824 annual pension.121 
Comparatively speaking, in 2010, the average 65-year-old retiree only had $30,000 in 
their retiree accounts.122 The method used to calculate FBI retirement pensions is stated 
as follows.  
The annual FERS Basic Benefit for retiring Special Agents is 1.7 percent 
of the “high-3 average salary” (the average annual salary earned during 
the 36 consecutive months of federal employment that would produce the 
highest average), multiplied by 20 (representing the first 20 years of 
creditable service), plus one percent of the “high-3” times the number of 
remaining years of service.123  
Retiring FBI agents benefit from a mandated pension retirement account and an 
optional (for individuals) investment account. As shown in Table 7, a special agent with 
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20 years of service who earned a gross pay of $40,000 per year may accumulate up to 
$154,220 dollars in their TSP. Clearly, the federal government’s retirement plan available 
to special agents is far better off than the average American citizen can attain. 
 
Table 7.   Federal Thrift Savings Plan Potential124 
 
4. Career Progression 
After being accepted into the FBI, special agent recruits are assigned to one of the 
five career paths available: the intelligence directorate, the counterintelligence division, 
the counterterrorism division, the criminal investigative division, or the cyber division.125 
In addition, depending on an agent’s special qualifications and after being assigned to 
either the counterintelligence or counterterrorism career paths, a special agent can 
specialize in the weapons of mass destruction program.  
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New special agents are typically assigned to small or medium sized field offices 
in which veteran special agents provide monitoring and mentorship to new agents. On the 
third year of service, special agents are transferred to larger field offices. 
E. INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT 
1. Internal Controls 
Institutional oversight refers to the “review, monitoring, and supervision of 
federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation [by Congress].”126 The 
control mechanisms in place help protect FBI agents and citizens. In addition, 
institutional oversight and guidelines ensures agents stay within established boundaries. 
Without these controls, agents would be free to pursue cases in a manner that could 
violate civil liberties. For example, terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) in the 
United States prompted the Attorney General to issue new general guidelines to the FBI 
regarding investigation and intelligence gathering. The guidelines clarified policies and 
ensured investigators were “confined to legitimate law enforcement interest.”127 Figure 6 
shows the five components of internal control recommend by the GAO.  
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Figure 6.  GAO’s Five Internal Control Components128 
Institutional controls help protect the public from civil liberty abuses by FBI 
agents. The GAO revealed that the FBI had additional controls in place to ensure 
compliance and to keep agents within authorized guidelines.129 The implementation of 
internal controls within the FBI “are a key component for ensuring that these new [rules] 
are implemented in a manner that protects civil liberties.”130 They address procedures, 
training and supervision that aim to protect civil liberties.131 For instance, David M. 
Walker states: 
Changes related to the process for conducting preliminary inquiries [to 
determine validity of alleged criminal activity] and terrorism 
investigations specify criteria for authorizing the activity, who is 
authorized to approve the activity, how long the activity may remain 
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initially authorized until re-approval [sic] is required, and what 
notifications of the activity are required within and outside the FBI.132  
To certify recruit compliance with internal controls, FBI agents are provided a 
manual of the internal control guidelines and classroom training, supervision, and 
inspections.133 In addition, the FBI uses classroom training, supervision, and inspections 
to certify recruit compliance with internal controls.134 The FBI follows the United States 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government more commonly referred to as 
the Green Book.135 
On the contrary, in 2003, the GAO revealed that the FBI had been approved to 
conduct various counterterrorism activities with no control mechanism in place. For 
example, no specific mandates were related to access and retention of data acquired 
during the course of FBI missions.136 Therefore, Walker presented to Congress that 
investigative regulations are not specific enough to ensure agents’ compliance with the 
internal controls and protection of civil liberties.137 Although 1,579 alleged cases of FBI 
misconduct were reported from 2000 to 2003, not one case was found to have violated 
the investigative authority guidelines in place during that time period.138 Institutional 
oversight of the FBI is essential to the effectiveness of the organization. Oversight is a 
positive thing that benefits the agency, helps the organization become more effective, and 
protects the public from unnecessary civil rights violations. 
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F. FUNDING 
Properly resourcing law enforcement institutions have shown to increase 
effectiveness. The FBI received a significant amount of U.S. tax dollars in 2013 and was 
tasked with three strategic goals: (1) to prevent terrorism and promote the nation’s 
security consistent with the rule of law, (2) to prevent crime, protect the rights of the 
American people, and enforce federal law, and (3) to ensure and support the fair, 
impartial, efficient, and transparent administration of justice at the federal, state, local, 
tribal, and international levels.139  
The DOJ’s Inspector General (IG) audit division reported that over nine billion 
dollars were required to achieve the FBI’s three strategic goals in FY2013.140 Funding 
for strategic goal number two resulted in a net increase of two percent from FY2012, 
which was attributed to a cyber realignment initiative, as well as mortgage and financial 
fraud.141 Strategic goal number three was aimed at providing the FBI with a variety of 
investigative tools like automation fingerprint identification systems, background checks, 
law enforcement data exchange, and other services delivered to various law enforcement 
agencies.142 See Table 8. 
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Table 8.   Strategic Goals and Funding Allocated143 
 
1. Reports of Effectiveness 
Statistics provide a measurement of success for the FBI. Thus, the DOJ required 
the FBI to maintain a track record of its accomplishments. Tracking accomplishments are 
useful because they can be tied to budget allocations and can help determine if the FBI 
was adequately funded to execute its mission. As illustrated by Table 9, the FBI arrested 
and investigated 25,186 alleged criminals. Out of those alleged criminals arrested, the 
prosecution was able to convince the legal courts to convict 59 percent or 15,274 
criminals for violating federal law.144 In other points of success, the FBI located 1,147 
missing children and confiscated over $8.2 trillion dollars in criminal assets. It must be 
noted that federal suspects are usually transferred to the custody of the U.S. Marshall 
Service (USMS) for booking, processing, and detention.145 
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According to the IG audit report, the FBI exceeded statistical accomplishments in 
2013 in the number of gang arrests. It dismantled over 162 criminal organizations, which 
has been the most in 14 years.146 Currently, for year 2014, the FBI was given a direct-
funded budget of 8.3 billion dollars.147 
 
Table 9.   Bureau Effectiveness by the Numbers, FY2012148 
Figures 7 and 8 provide a glimpse into the institutional success of law 
enforcement agencies. From 2006 to 2010, the FBI averaged a 4.2 percent annual 
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increase in arrests. However, of those arrested, only 55.6 percent were prosecuted, 5.2 
percent were disposed, and 39.3 percent were declined indicating that FBI agents had a 
significantly high number of arrests without substantial evidence to prosecute these 
suspects. 
 
Figure 7.  Suspects Arrested and Booked by the U.S. Marshals Service, by 
Arresting Agency, 2006 and 2010149 
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Figure 8.  Outcomes of Suspects in Matters Concluded by Department of 
Homeland Security and Department of Justice, 2010150 
G. CONCLUSION 
The FBI has shown to be an established, reputable, and effective organization. 
Even though the FBI is downsizing, the government has continued to provide an 
increasing amount of money to help the agency meet its strategic goals. The FBI’s rigid 
recruitment standards provide the agency with a highly qualified and intelligent force. 
The training regimen is extensive and involves a mental, physical, and academic 
approach to problem solving that increases the net worth of its recruits and agents. 
Recruits are provided with the tools necessary to become effective investigative agents. 
Furthermore, the FBI offers special agents with a variety of advancement opportunities 
for their career paths. Salary compensation provides officers with enough income to live 
in the middle class bracket, which helps retain officers and prevent corruption within the 
institution. Congress provides institutional oversight of the FBI, which helps prevent 
corruption and civil rights violation. In addition, the FBI IA section provides internal 
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oversight of its agents to ensure compliance. Congress has continued to fund the FBI at 
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IV. THE MEXICAN FEDERAL MINISTERIAL POLICE 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
This chapter provides background information on the PFM agency and attempts 
to apply the five factors previously identified as contributing to police effectiveness. 
Therefore, this chapter examines the design of the PFM institution in terms of personnel 
recruitment, training and education, career path, institutional oversight, and funding. 
These factors are important because they provide the framework necessary to improve 
law enforcement capabilities in Mexico and increase the legitimacy of the government.151 
A. BACKGROUND 
The PFM was transformed to its current organizational structure after numerous 
attempts by the government to control corruption and ineffective policing practices. 
Before the PFM or Federal Investigation Agency (AFI) was in control over federal 
investigations, the PJF was responsible for preventing federal crime.152 However, 
corruption within the PJF proved overwhelming for the Fox administration, and in 2000, 
was replaced by the AFI.153 Institutional changes did little to prevent corruption within 
the AFI. Regional comandantes and top-level officials were bribed by cartels.154 In May 
2009, and after being “fed up with the corruption of the A.F.I,” Felipe Calderon’s 
administration revamped the PJF.155 The organization was replaced by the PFM, which 
has become the “principle investigating arm of the [PGR].”156 Rampant corruption and 
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the agency’s inability to prevent crime pushed the government to overhaul the institution. 
During Vicente Fox’s administration, corrupt police officers were reshuffled or 
dismissed. However, these officers were re-employed by the AFI/PFM because no 
database-tracking capability was available to scrutinize the applications of dismissed 
officers.157 
Often times, police were assigned mundane tasks that rendered them ineffective 
as an investigative agency. According to Daniel Sabet, “[the] ministerial police are tasked 
to carrying out warrants on cases they know nothing about; they are asked to chauffeur 
witnesses to the public ministers rather than conduct interviews themselves; and they are 
buried under paperwork.”158 These policies rendered the police ineffective and converted 
them into a reactionary force that acted more like security guards.159 In addition, 
reporting requirements took the power of police investigation away from its agents. 
Agents were forced to focus on the paperwork trail of policing rather than on 
investigating the crime.160   
Legal PGR reforms in 2001 and 2009 helped focus the PFM into a more 
investigative agency. For instance, the PFM relegated tactical analysis and reactive 
operations to the PF in 2009, which allowed the government to streamline the PFM 
institute and concentrate on investigations on federal crime.161 In addition, the PGR gave 
the PF more power over its own investigations, which it did not have prior to 2001.162 
The policy helped enhance the capability of the PF by allowing it to conduct 
investigations immediately after a crime had been violated. The PGR’s policy was 
beneficial to the productivity and effectiveness of the police because it helped focus the 
PFM on investigations and not on other mundane tasks. 
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The restructuring of the AFI/PFM in 2001 and in 2009 by the PGR led to an 
increased number of investigations and warrants executed by investigative agents.163 
According to Daniel Sabet, federal performance indicators showed that the average time 
to investigate a crime fell from 270 days in 2006 to an average of 154 days for years 2007 
to 2009.164 The report also indicated that agents investigated more cases and executed 
more judicial warrants during 2006 to 2009, which demonstrated that the PFM institute 
was capable and effective at enforcing law and meeting new government standards. 
While PFM agents carried out streamlined investigative directives and were able 
to perform under the new PFM structure, the new police model created a productivity 
problem for the PGR. Judicial warrants became backlogged and the attorney general’s 
office was overwhelmed, which slowed PFM investigations. The number of sentences 
executed by the judicial arm of the law fell from 22.4 percent in 2006 to 15.3 percent in 
2009.165 
Mexico’s judicial system is tasked with protecting citizens and presiding over the 
PFM, but that system has not been effective at preventing crime. Law enforcement in 
Mexico is mandated by article 21 of the Mexican constitution, which empowers the 
judiciary with the exclusive right to impose penalties on citizens and prevent crime. 
However, the public prosecutor with such authoritative power has been unable to reduce 
the high levels of violent crime by drug traffickers or corruption within police 
institutions.166 In fact, according to Pablo Piccato, “The [Mexican] police and judiciary 
have been perceived by the population as sources of insecurity and unmerited harassment 
rather than protection.”167 
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Militarization in Mexico has played a key role in preventing public security 
institutions from improving their capability to deter crime. Although the PFM has been 
redesignated several times, more emphasis has been placed on militarization practices 
vis-à-vis civilian law enforcement. Militarization as defined in this thesis is the 
appointment of military agents and senior military officers as officials in charge of key 
political positions.168 According to Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, military involvement at 
federal levels has increased because of the president’s ability to appoint former military 
generals as the attorney generals to the public ministry.169 The public ministry operates 
without autonomy due, in part, to this administrative tie with Mexico’s top leader.170 
Hence, the president has significantly influenced the administrative and executive 
performance of the PGR. Consequently, the government has continued to rely on the 
military instead of the police to combat drug trafficking and organized crime.171 
1. Mission 
The PFM agency has adopted U.S. FBI strategic goals.172 According to laws that 
went into effect and published in the official federation diary on March 5, 2013, the PFM 
is tasked with conducting investigative functions to support the attorney general’s office 
in the prosecution of federal crimes.173 Similarly, the PFM conducts investigations and 
apprehensions to support the PGR with administrative prosecutorial evidence against 
federal law violations, such as organized crime, illegal drugs, intellectual property rights, 
copyright infringement, and other types of federal crimes.174 However, unlike the FBI, 
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which has a stronger strategic intelligence role in the United States, Mexico’s PFM does 
not emphasize the use of intelligence capabilities to prevent terrorist attacks in its 
country. 
2. Organizational Structures 
Mexico’s PFM organizational chart revealed a minor attempt by the PGR to 
duplicate the FBI.175 According to research on the PFM, the institute is less hierarchically 
dispersed than the FBI vis-à-vis institutional capabilities. For instance, the PFM has far 
fewer divisions than the FBI and each commanding officer in charge reports directly to 
the director. The organization chart in Figure 9 shows the structure of the PFM. 
 
Figure 9.  Federal Ministerial Police Organization Chart176  
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Six areas of responsibility provide the PGR with pertinent investigative offices to 
build cases against criminals. Starting from left to right, the first branch acts on judicial 
injunctions and tackles the backlog of 35,000 arrests, warrants, and re-apprehension 
orders. In addition, it is responsible for searching, locating, and capturing fugitives who 
take refuge in Mexico.177 A second branch provides special security for branch heads in 
31 states and the federal district in Mexico. This branch performs detention activities for 
apprehended individuals, which is similar to the U.S. Marshall Service. The third branch 
provides information and case evidence to the prosecution and provides chain of custody 
oversight to help in the prosecution of a case. The fourth branch manages police actions 
based on relationships with international organizations. It coordinates police activities 
with the world’s largest International Police Organization (INTERPOL) inside and 
outside its borders, such as extradition, updating criminal databases, and coordinating 
actions against fugitives. The fifth branch provides IT support to the agency, maintains 
databases, and ensures communications networks are operational. The sixth branch 
provides technical and logistic support for the sustainment of the police force. This 
branch also updates, maintains, and establishes mechanisms for the implementation of 
policies and guidelines for the strategic development of the police. 
B. PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT 
1. Manning the Force 
Statistical data that accounts for AFI/PFM personnel has traditionally been 
inconsistent.178 The PGR reported that in 2007, the number of police agents was 5,324 of 
which 423 were assigned to protect officials.179 Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona finds that in 
2007, Mexico’s National Public Safety Commission (Systema Nacional de Seguridad 
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Pública—SNSP) reported a total of 5,900 PFM agents who accounted for 1.60 percent of 
Mexico’s total law enforcement personnel.180 One thing is certain, the number of agents 
employed has continued to decline. The PGR estimated that in 2012, approximately 
3,630 agents were on duty, which included 556 employed for the protection of 
government officials.181 In that same report (sixth labor report), the PGR revealed that a 
national personnel accountability registry system (Sistema Institucional del Registro de 
Personal Sustantivo—SIRPS) only accounted for 3,150 PFM agents.182 These 
inconsistent numbers reveal the inefficient nature of the tracking capabilities of law 
enforcement. Mexico’s PFM agency could improve its employee screening capabilities 
by allowing FBI partners to train and equip the PFM human resource personnel with the 
establishment of policies and the use of technology that has worked to retain and select 
employees within the FBI.  
2. Recruitment 
The Mexican government passed reforms that improved the quality of its police 
recruits. In 2000, President Vicente Fox aggressively pursued police reforms by 
announcing that public security was his top priority.183 In 2001, his reforms transformed 
requirements for officers. Thus, the AFI pushed for “policies that emphasized education, 
training, merit-based promotion, higher salaries, and improved equipment and 
facilities.”184 In addition, new government policies required that federal agents (PF, AFI 
and PFM) possess college degrees, to provide law enforcement institutions with high 
caliber educated officers. In 2009, the Calderon administration implemented reforms that 
imposed stringent requirements on PFM recruits and all active agents. Recruits and 
agents were required to pass polygraph tests, disclose their finances, and pass medical, 
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toxicology, social-economic, and psychological examinations.185 These policies appear in 
line with the FBI’s stringent policies for its employees and could result in a significant 
contribution to the effectiveness of the PFM institution. 
The evolution of recruiting standards continued to improve since Fox took office. 
The PGR ensured that PFM recruits meet minimum standards to join the force. These 
standards provide the institution with a pool of qualified candidates from which it can 
select and employ. Article 35 of PGR law established 14 minimum requirements for new 
applicants and imposed another 10 requirements for active agents.186 For example, to 
gain entry into the PFM police-training program, a PFM recruit must be a Mexican-born 
citizen and hold no other nation’s citizenship. As previously mentioned, a college degree 
or equivalent education was required. Candidates must prove that they are between the 
ages of 21 and 30 and meet minimum height requirements; men must be no less than five 
feet and four inches in height and women can be no less than five feet and one-eight inch 
in height. 
PGR law supported government reforms by adding recruitment policies on new 
applicants and current agents. Weight requirements are based on height as determined by 
the body mass index of the Mexican Official Standard NOM-174SSA1-1998. Men have 
been required to complete compulsory military obligations before applying. Candidates 
are required to be in good public standing, have no pending or permanent criminal 
convictions, and be able to pass drug-screening tests. These requirements are similar to 
the FBI’s rigid and trustworthy screening process that applicants must meet. In addition, 
since many PFM officers dismissed for corruption had regained entry into the agency, 
new applicants who had worked as PGR police officers, AFI agents, PJF, or as an officer 
in another police force, could no longer apply. Candidates have been required to be in 
good physical condition, able to pass a physical training course, and hold a valid driver’s 
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license. Each of these implemented policies was similar to the FBI’s requirements and an 
attempt to introduce quality agents into the PFM institution. 
Mexico’s PGR has adopted institutional mechanisms to retain and recruit 
trustworthy individuals. For example, candidates must be willing to submit to tests and 
assessments that determine the level of trust and confidence the government can expect 
from its agents. The organization that conducts this screening process is the Centro de 
Evaluacion y Control de Confianza.187 The testing and evaluation subject recruits to six 
main criteria, which are governed by article 49 of PGR law: background check, medical 
evaluation, psychological assessment, polygraph, toxicology analysis, and other 
unidentified tests.188 The PGR adapted FBI recruitment practices to improve the quality 
and integrity of its agents. 
C. TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
1. Training 
Training regimens are critical to the effectiveness of a police force. Niels Uildriks 
posits, “training is also a form of internal institutional control.”189 Training provides 
recruits and agents with a performance baseline, which they can rely on to execute their 
duties effectively. However, training baselines are only as effective as the policy that 
aims to improve the institution. Police training in Mexico varies greatly among police 
agencies, which often educate recruits and agents with dissimilar content and focus.190 
Training and education has provided the institution and recruits with a desired identity, 
instills codes of conduct, and provides the agency with operational guidelines.191 
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In addition, cadets and active agents require constant instruction to benefit from 
the knowledge of a well-seasoned veteran force. According to Asch, Burger, and Fu, 
police reforms in 2001 aimed to improve training and education that would help 
modernize and professionalize the AFI.192 However, the agency was plagued by a “cloud 
of corruption in 2005 with [the] announcement by the Office of the Attorney General that 
nearly 20 percent of AFI’s officers were under investigation for involvement with 
organized crime.”193 In 2009, new reforms improved police training and education 
requirements and gave the investigative power to the PF.194 Government reforms were 
intended to reduce corruption by replacing the AFI with a newly named and less corrupt 
organization called the PFM. 
Currently, PFM recruits undergo a six-month training program to become Class C 
agents. Trainees partake in physical and intellectual activities designed to increase the 
knowledge of law enforcement recruits. Specifics on PFM training curricula could not be 
located online or in scholarly material. However, a search within a PFM recruitment 
Facebook page for 2013 recruits revealed that an August 2013 posting stated that at least 
40 recruits had been scheduled to train at the National Institute for Criminal Science 
(Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales—INACIPE).195 However, if the video on 
Youtube.com is an indication of the seriousness with which ministerial police take their 
training, its leadership needs to redefine what actual training is supposed to entail. Much 
of the training in the video showed a relaxed attitude toward police actions in scenario-
based training. Furthermore, the institution should recruit mature and experienced 
officers who can urgently impart the PGR’s need for serious training considerations for 
Mexico’s police.196 
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International organizations, besides those in the United States, have provided 
police training to Mexico’s PFM. A memorandum dated February 5, 2014 revealed that 
Spain provided anti-organized crime training to the agency from May 2010 to May 
2012.197 According to the Spanish Embassy in Mexico, six training activities were 
completed. Ten people from the tactical analysis group were trained to detect money-
laundering activities and 80 PFM officers were trained in evidentiary chain of custody. A 
special intervention group was established to deal with hazardous substances and 
explosive devices. In addition, Spanish trainers created a panel within the PFM to 
investigate terrorism and subversive groups in Mexico. Spain also enabled the creation of 
a PFM Special Operations Forces Group (Grupo Especial de Operación—GEO) and 
trained it to fight organized crime. Little is known of the extent of training provided by 
external organizations in Mexico, but the FBI is known to conduct training in various 
locations worldwide. Hence, it could leverage its training capabilities by encouraging 
cross-agency cooperation to help improve the law enforcement capabilities of Mexico’s 
PFM agency. 
2. Professionalism 
Political pressure exerted by presidents on police statistics provides an obstacle to 
the development of an effective law enforcement institution. Research on the political 
effects of police policies has shown that Mexican presidents have long used law 
enforcement statistics for their own political gain. According to Uildriks, police forces 
should seek to become an autonomous organization that functions under the basic 
principle of rule of law.198 Since the PFM is directly responsive to presidential directives, 
it may find it difficult to change its organization as an autonomous and professionalized 
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police force. Furthermore, the difficulties in achieving fundamental changes for the 
police institution cannot be achieved until it is depoliticized.199  
The federal prosecution, as part of the executive branch, encouraged the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes to support political accomplishments. For 
example, under Lopez Obrador, the government of Mexico City had imposed arrest 
quotas “for particular types of crimes (such as auto theft), and police received financial 
rewards for meeting these.”200 However, during presidential elections, quotas were 
removed, presumably to show that the current administration had been successful in 
reducing crime.201 
Mexico’s human rights training contributes to the enhancement of police 
professionalism. Uildriks points out that Rachael Neild’s research on police reform 
identified human rights training as an integral part of the curricula to professionalism. In 
addition, she posits that human rights training should be central to the academic program, 
vis-à-vis just being an add-on course.202 Furthermore, law enforcement institutions 
should incorporate the role of human rights into every aspect of their mission with the 
intent to uphold the constitutional right of every citizen. The PFM could improve its 
impact on human rights violations by establishing similar FBI practices that incorporate 
human rights components into its core curricula to ensure agents can uphold the 
individual rights of citizens. 
D. CAREER PATHS 
1. Salary Compensation 
On average, Class C PFM agents earn a base salary of $499.32 USD per month 
but, as shown in Figure 10, agents earn enough income to be classified as middle class 
workers in Mexico. According to the United Nations, Mexico falls within a low to 
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middle-income class economy with a middle class that earns between $1,026 to $4,035 
USD.203 
 
Figure 10.  PGR Starting Salary (in Mexican Pesos) for Class C PFM Agents, 
August 1, 2013204 
In addition to base their salaries, Class C agents receive a hazardous duty pay 
(Compensacion por Riesgo y Mercado Bruta) of $2,315.11 USD per month.205 The total 
monthly allowance averages to $2,814.43 USD for Class C agents. Agents earn almost 
three times more (29%) than the average Mexican who earns a yearly wage of $9,885.206 
Agents earn substantially more than the average Mexican, which means that they can live 
comfortably during their service to the federal government. These numbers while 
significantly lower than the FBI still allow for a decent living for agents in Mexico. 
2. Retirement Compensation 
A large gap exists between the base salary earned and the total salary authorized 
during an officer’s career. PFM agents can only earn retirement by calculating an 
officer’s base salary, and it does not include hazardous duty pay. This gap can leave 
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retiring officers with little incentive to be productive or effective during their time in 
service. As previously mentioned, living conditions for officers during the performance 
of their duties is that of a middle-income family. However, when officers finish their 
careers, they must rely on a relatively smaller retirement pension. The retirement gap 
means they have less disposable income to maintain their middle-class lifestyle, which is 
what agents are accustomed to living. Low pensions contribute to corruption practices 
towards the end of an agent’s career because expected earnings upon retirement are much 
lower after they have completed their service to the nation. 
The secretary general governs government employee retirements under state 
social worker laws (Ley del Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los 
Trabajadores del Estado—LISSSTE), Title VI, Article’s 252, 253, and 254.207 These 
laws apply government-wide to all law enforcement officers depending on their position 
and rank. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the average retirement age for Mexicans is 65 (male or female) and most people 
will live until the age of 72.208 
The government provides several alternatives for federal employees to collect a 
pension. Mexico’s social security benefits program guarantees that individuals at the age 
of 65 and with 25 years of public service can at least collect the standard minimum 
wage.209 However, social security benefits are insufficient for most people in Mexico 
because they are relatively low.  
Like the FBI, the PGR is under federal law and must offer alternative pensions to 
its employees. The PGR Benefits Manual for Employees states that PFM agents can elect 
a retirement account with or without a bonus. In the first case, employees may contribute 
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to an individual retirement account with up to 2 percent of their base salary. The PGR 
will then contribute 3.25 pesos for every peso that PFM agents allot to this individual 
retirement account. Base salaries account for only one-third of an employee’s monetary 
income (Class C agents earn $499.32 USD per month); thereby, committing the 
government to match individual contributions at a relatively low amount. 
A second retirement option that agents can elect omits any contributions to an 
individual retirement account by employees or the government. Retirement pension 
distributions are calculated by taking the employees’ age and years of service. For 
example, male employees with 53 years of age and 15 years of service could retire in the 
year 2014 with 50 percent of their base salary. Women aged 53 with 15 years of service 
can retire two years earlier than a man and receive the same 50 percent of their base 
salary.210 Officers with at least 10 years of service and retiring at age 62 and beyond can 
retire with a guaranteed salary (in pesos) as depicted in Table 10. 
 
Table 10.   Years 2012 and 2013, Voluntary Retirement Income (in Mexican 
Pesos) Ages 62 and Up with at Least 10 Years of Service 
3. Career Progression 
In 2005, the administration of former President Vicente Fox improved regulations 
for career-service law enforcement officers. Article 2 guarantees equal income and 
promotion opportunities are available to all law enforcement officers. Instead of being 
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strictly political in nature, as when promotions were based on whom you knew, the Fox 
administration added requirements so that advancement would be based on merit and 
experience.211 These advancements may help increase the effectiveness of Mexico’s law 
enforcement overall. PGR Career Service Law, Article 2 states: 
Career Service Federal Law Enforcement is a system that ensures equal 
opportunity for income and provides promotions based on merit and 
experience; designed to elevate and promote the professionalization of its 
members and ensure compliance with the principles established by the 
Organic Law of the Attorney General’s Office. The Career Service for 
Federal Law Enforcement is comprised of the ministerial and expert police 
branches, the prosecutors in the Federation, members of the Federal 
Investigative Police, professional experts and Technicians.212 
According to regulations, investigative officers could potentially advance to nine 
levels of promotion. The first three sets of opportunities are strictly for agent positions. 
The second are supervisory levels and last three are commissioner levels. All agents start 
at Class C but can progress to Class B and then to Class A.213 Chapter III, Article 46 
regarding PGR career advancement, lists the minimum criteria that law enforcement 
agents must meet to be promoted. In general, Class C, B, and A agents must work for two 
years in their respective levels to be eligible for a promotion.214 Career advancement 
opportunities exist at supervisory investigative levels to qualifying agents. After reaching 
the level of a Class A agent, those promoted can advance as investigative supervising 
officers who manage Class C, B, and A agents. Advancement opportunities are well 
within grasp of the new recruits. However, since the institution had a history of being 
political in nature, the effectiveness of the new promotion system has yet to be 
determined. 
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E. INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT 
1. Internal Controls 
An abuse study by Fundar, a Mexican-based independent think tank, revealed that 
ministerial police abuse their power to some extent. Mexico City residents who had 
contact with ministerial police accused them of threatening citizens to obtain a 
confession, of causing harm, or of charging them on false grounds.215 Therefore, it is 
important to limit the power of law enforcement institutions and reign in the power of the 
police force. According to Asch, Burger, and Fu, “reforms that seek to standardize and 
modernize police organizations, professionalize the police force through clearly 
articulated civil service systems, and impart better oversight through data collection can 
be considered efforts to limit the use of power by those with power.”216 Mexican PFM 
regulations discussed thus far seem to lean towards improving the effectiveness and 
professionalism of its force, which political administrations have expected them to meet. 
The government has imposed internal controls policies to improve the reliability 
and trust record of the PFM. Through strict administrative polices, applicants and current 
agents must subject themselves to government tests and evaluation for trust and 
confidence. PGR law gives current PFM agents 30 days to take these tests, which are 
controlled by the Centro de Evaluacion y Control de Confianza. 
In an attempt to stop the trust and confidence tests, a former PGR officer 
challenged the constitutionality of Articles 46 and 54 of the Organic Law of the PGR, 
which authorizes the PGR to conduct trust and confidence tests on its officers. In March 
2014, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (La Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Nación—(SCJN) upheld the PGR’s constitutional right to perform control and trust 
assessments for its employees on the grounds that it helps meet personnel criteria that 
must be used for its accreditation as a law enforcement institute.217 The support of the 
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judicial system in this case will substantially change the quality of recruits who enter its 
force. 
While PFM policies shape the administrative controls of its officers, technology is 
also playing a similar role. Global positioning satellites (GPS) are providing tracking 
capabilities to the Mexican police. In an effort to protect and control its officers in 
vehicles, PFM management has implemented GPS-tracking equipment on its vehicles to 
monitor the police fleet. Through the use of satellite tracking capabilities, PFM leaders 
are able to provide immediate law enforcement support to its agents, while also ensuring 
GPS data is used to audit (protecting or prosecuting) the behavior of its agents.218 These 
actions on part of the management will continue to strengthen the capacity and 
effectiveness of the PFM to become more effective like the FBI. 
2. Disciplinary Control 
Very little literature in English and Spanish shows the disciplinary methods 
employed by the PGR or the PFM. However, it is clear that article 21 of PGR law places 
the general inspector (GI) in charge of the IA section specifically designated to audit the 
PFM.219 Through this IA section, PFM employees are subject to investigations in 
determining the culpability of officers accused of wrongdoing. Furthermore, the IA 
section helps monitor and protect PGR agents from potential lawsuits. These 
intermediary controls provide the PFM institution with similar protections afforded to the 
FBI. 
F. FUNDING 
The U.S. and Mexican governments have invested a significant amount of money 
to improve the institutional effectiveness of law of the PFM institution. As of 2012, over 
350 million pesos were invested to improve the capability of the PFM. For instance, the 
agency acquired 24 ballistic armored tactical transport (BATT) vehicles capable of 
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transporting 24 agents.220 In addition, the PFM invested 50 million pesos, plus an 
additional 150 million provided by the Mérida Initiative (MI), to improve the 
investigative aptitude of PFM agents.221  
1. Merida Initiative 
In 2007, the Calderon administration requested support from the United States to 
combat drug trafficking and organized crime.222 The United States agreed, and in 2008, 
implemented the measure that provided U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central America. 
As part of the package, U.S. assistance helped provide Mexico’s police force with the 
resources (training and equipping) to help increase its level of effectiveness. In addition, 
Mexican police forces that engaged in anti-crime efforts also received U.S. support in the 
form of intelligence sharing and operational support.223 U.S. priorities seem to be heeded 
by Mexico but tactical efforts alone were not enough to fight against drug-trafficking 
problems. In March 2010, the United States and Mexico agreed to change its strategic 
direction and focus on renovating weak government institutions and the underlying social 
conditions.224 
The MI provided the necessary collaboration platform for North American law 
enforcement institutions to build trust. Furthermore, the transfer of technological and 
operational procedures helped transform Mexico’s law enforcement policies to those 
closer to a North American perspective. Since 2008, the MI has provided an estimated 
$1,743 billion dollars in assistance to International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) as seen in Table 11.225 Honorable William R. Brownfield, 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of 
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the U.S. Department of State said, “the United States had delivered $1.2 billion in support 
and assistance to professionalize Mexico’s law enforcement and build capacity under the 
rule of law.”226 Some 4,000 federal police investigators completed U.S. training courses 
under the Merida Initiative.227 Moreover, Mexico has spent 10 dollars for every dollar 
contributed by the United States for its security challenges.228 The U.S. government 
provided an additional “$111 million worth of inspection equipment that has resulted in 
more than $3 billion in elicit goods seized in Mexico.”229 
 
Table 11.   FY2008–FY2015 Mérida Funding for Mexico230 
Merida funding provided a human rights component that if implemented properly 
could transform the corrupt law enforcement institutions into a credible, reliable, and 
effective police force. The focus has shifted from training and equipping security entities 
to institution building. In an effort to reduce police abuses in Mexico, the U.S. Congress 
placed human rights conditions on 15 percent of Merida-related assistance.231 A 2012 
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U.S. consolidated Appropriations Act gave the Secretary of State 90 days to report how 
the U.S. Merida programs helped police reform in Mexico.232 
The MI provided a significant amount of funding dedicated to institution building 
of the judicial system. According to the Wilson Center in 2008, former President Bush 
signed into law legislation that stipulated at least $73,500,000 dollars for “judicial 
reform, institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities.”233 In addition, $3 
million dollars was provided to the government of Mexico for the implementation of “a 
unified registry of federal, state, and municipal officers.”234 
a. Special Canine Unit 
The Mexican government has taken advantage of the MI to increase the capability 
of its police units. According to a CRS report, MI has increasingly provided training to 
Mexican canine teams in an effort to strengthen its law enforcement institution.235 As of 
November 2012, the PFM had a squad of 53 accredited and specially trained canine 
animals.236 The canine and canine handler units provide the PFM with an important law 
enforcement capability. The canine unit is trained to conduct drug, bomb, munitions, and 
arms-sniffing for counterdrug operations, as well as security for high-level personnel, and 
can search for kidnap and murder victims. No statistical information is available to 
substantiate the success or failure of canine units in Mexico. Hence, assessing the 
effectiveness of PFM canine units is elusive at best and cannot be determined with the 
existing information. 
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The PGR received an addition $5 million dollars from the MI to improve its 
forensic capability.237 Although, no statistical data exists to establish the use of forensic 
analysis in the investigation of crimes, what is certain is that the PFM has hired an 
additional 40 forensic experts following university studies in Nuevo León.238 Further 
development of the forensic capability of the PFM is needed to comprehend completely 
its impact on the effectiveness of the organization. 
c. Interagency and Intra-Agency Communications Cells (Fusion Center) 
The PFM has a communications intelligence center that provides information-
sharing capabilities to many government agencies in Mexico. As illustrated Figure 11, the 
PGR fusion center provides communications integration among the following agencies: 
the PF, the state PGJ, the PFM, other federal, state and local institutions, the PGF-DF, 
CEDAC, the PFM intelligence division, international organizations (INTERPOL), and 
the state C-4 center. In addition, the communications platform provides intelligence 
information to Mexico’s 31 states and the federal district.239 The fusion center is 
designated as a bridge to the national intelligence center called Plataforma Mexico.240 
Using this communications center, any agency can query and collaborate with entities 
integrated within the network. The PGR fusion center encourages cross-agency 
collaboration. This capability is significant given the issues of accountability for law 
enforcement personnel. Although the results of policing actions using this new platform 
have yet to be determined, the center is a key aspect of cross-agency collaboration that 
has shown to contribute significantly to effective policing practices within the FBI. 
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Figure 11.  PGR Communications Center 
G. CONCLUSION 
PGR reforms streamlined the focus of the PFM institution towards a more 
investigative and intelligence role. Given the increased effectiveness of the PFM, the 
federal prosecution was surprised with the increased caseload and could not work on 
cases quick enough. Presidential administrations continue to influence PFM policy 
politically by appointing former military leaders as department heads. 
Although personnel management issues are still being worked out, new 
recruitment policies encourages highly educated applicants to enter the force to improve 
the quality of officers. However, very little information exists regarding the level of 
training provided to recruits, which is equally important for an effective law enforcement 
force. Law enforcement officers should incorporate human rights training into the police 
core curriculum to reduce the amount of human rights violations. PFM promotion 
policies provide agents an opportunity to advance up the COC by requiring only two 
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years in current rank to reach the next level. However, more statistical data is required to 
analyze actual promotion potential within the agency given its previous political 
advancement practices it employed prior to those reforms. 
Considering the per capita income of an average middle-class citizen, PFM agents 
appear to earn enough income to live comfortably in Mexico. Salaries during a PFM 
officer’s career are within the range of middle-class economic status. However, based on 
current retirement policies, PFM officers can only expect to retire with at least 50 percent 
of their base income. In other words, officers are not provided with enough money to 
meet the middle-income bracket they were used to living. Thus, an agent’s incentive to 
remain lawful and effective as a public servant may not be as attractive towards the end 
of service as what a cartel organization may be able to offer. 
The PFM agency has little civilian oversight over its operations. However, the 
PGR was able to create a separate IA section to provide governmental oversight over the 
PFM. Through this IA department, agents can be audited for problematic conduct or to 
help protect agents against public lawsuits. 
The effectiveness of the PFM is directly correlated to the capability of the judicial 
or prosecutorial department to prosecute criminal cases. Reforms that include funding for 
an effective prosecutorial agency are necessary to maintain the performance of the PFM. 
The PFM and PGR attorney agencies must work congruently to support each other 
mutually with the development of criminal cases. The effectiveness of the PFM was 
directly correlated to the productivity of the judicial system. Hence, effective law 
enforcement agencies cannot be expected to be successful on their own without the 
support of an effective judicial system. 
David Shirk and Rios Cazares argue, “real progress requires comprehensive 
institutional reforms that increase integrity, effectiveness, and accountability of the state 
apparatus itself in order to ensure greater access to justice for Mexico’s citizens.”241 A 
balance of agent priorities needs to be addressed to ensure that agents are able to focus on 
                                                
241 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18. 
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an investigation. Standard operating procedures that encourage investigation and include 
a standardized paperwork protocol will enhance the effectiveness of the police. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis focuses on five factors that may improve the effectiveness of law 
enforcement in Mexico. The FBI was chosen as a model to compare to the PFM because 
the FBI is viewed as a reputable and effective law enforcement organization. This 
comparison places the Mexican PFM and the U.S. FBI in a bi-national perspective that 
makes the analysis relevant for policy makers. The resulting analysis demonstrates the 
progress achieved by Mexico’s federal law enforcement while also identifying areas that 
need improvement. 
This thesis uncovers new practices that have led to increased effectiveness of the 
Mexican PFM. It analyzed five factors important for an effective police force. This 
section begins with a summary of the FBI and concludes by revealing information about 
personnel recruitment practices, training issues, career path incentives, institutional 
oversight, and funding to improve the effectiveness of Mexico’s PFM institution. 
A. UNITED STATES 
The U.S. FBI agency has become an institution respected worldwide. It achieved 
success by building its organization on strong institutional fundamentals, such as those 
analyzed within this thesis. In addition, strong leaders have continued to improve the 
capability of the agency by targeting federal criminals. It has established itself as an 
effective organization that trains and supports law enforcement institutions within and 
outside U.S. borders.  
The MI has facilitated collaboration between the FBI and the PFM, which has 
improved the law enforcement capabilities of Mexican authorities. It has enabled the FBI 
to provide training, education, and technology to Mexico’s PFM institution. The United 
States will become more secure within its borders by protecting its interests abroad and 
continuing to invest in Mexico’s law enforcement institutions. Cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies may also help prevent an attack similar to 9/11 in the region. 
Moreover, improving the capability of the PFM in Mexico may help reduce the use of 
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militarization efforts against DTOs, and instead, encourage democratic practices to 
prevail. 
B. MEXICO 
Mexico continues to struggle with combating DTOs and corruption. Politicians 
have been unable to transform the PFM into an effective civilian police force and have 
continued to rely on militarization strategies. As a federal agency constitutionally 
designated to fight crime, the PFM should be the focus of policies that aim to increase 
public security in Mexico. 
1. Personnel recruitment 
New PGR laws have forced the PFM to adopt stronger recruitment policies that 
increase the quality of police officers. The PFM’s personnel recruitment standards are 
stronger than ever and resemble policies similar to those of the FBI. PFM candidates are 
now required to provide more personal information for evaluation by a trust and 
confidence board. These adopted policies have provided a new generation of police 
recruits who have more education and pass full background checks. Recruitment policies 
have increased the ability of federal law enforcement officers to protect citizens from 
human rights violations and drug trafficking crimes. 
Mexico has a history of little administrative transparency or sharing of 
information among its law enforcement agencies, which has caused inconsistencies 
among human resource accountability statistics. For instance, the number of personnel 
employed by the PFM has not been consistent with the reported number of PFM officers. 
Improvements in a human resource department’s vis-à-vis personnel training and 
accountability technology should be considered. For example, enhancing the capability of 
administrative staff to account for personnel using technology can improve the 
effectiveness of the institution to exercise administrative control over employees. 
a. Training and Education 
Training and education regimens continue to improve with each reform. However, 
little is known about the training schedule and/or course material, which does not allow 
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for a comprehensive assessment of the value of police training within the PFM. The FBI 
is postured to assist the PFM because it has a trusted and proven law enforcement 
academy program that may help improve the effectiveness of PFM officers. Increasing 
the capacity of agents to investigate and arrest suspected criminals will help alleviate the 
pressure on political administrations and could reduce their reliance on militarization 
strategies to tackle organized crime. 
b. Career Path 
The PFM provides ample opportunity for career advancement. Prior promotion 
practices were ingrained into the police structure that encouraged corruptive practices. 
Promotions have evolved to consider merit and experience over personal relationships. 
However, PFM and/or PGR leaders have conducted little research to determine the extent 
of new policy adherence. While salaries are consistent with middle class income and 
provide PFM agents with a fair compensation for their services, retirement pay is far 
below the expected compensation. An officer’s end of service benefits may encourage 
corruptive practices or the acceptance of bribes because PFM agents’ expected earnings 
fall drastically short of the middle class income. Mexico should consider changes to 
salary policies because currently, retirement pay does not include hazardous duty pay, 
which is substantially higher than base pay. Adjusting policies in this manner will 
alleviate income concerns for officers at retirement and may detract from corrupt 
practices. 
c. Institutional Oversight 
PGR reforms changed recruitment policies and have subjected employees to 
additional tests that aim to scrutinize and measure trustworthiness. These administrative 
procedures are similar to the FBI’s standards for selecting agents and have shown to 
increase police effectiveness and the level of trust the agency can place in its workforce. 
d. Funding 
MI has provided Mexico with a substantial amount of funding to improve the 
effectiveness of the PFM in combating organized crime and government corruption. 
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Merida funding is currently focused on institution building and cooperation among 
organizations to ensure the stability of the region. Irrespective of the Mexican 
government’s continued use of the military to fight DTOs, U.S. law enforcement 
agencies have trained and helped equip Mexico’s federal law enforcement organizations. 
With continued assistance from the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement agencies, the 
Mexican government may be able to transfer responsibility of public security from the 
military back to federal law enforcement agencies. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It appears that Mexico is finally on the right track to increasing the effectiveness 
of the PFM institution. However, more reforms, changes to policy, and investment at the 
political and institutional levels are needed to continue to increase the effectiveness of the 
federal police. Still, more is required in terms of maximizing autonomous control within 
the police to ensure it is allowed to investigate without undue political influence.  
In addition, the judicial system should not be an afterthought. Instead, the justice 
system requires the same level of investment in its institution to support an increase in the 
effectiveness of public security agencies in Mexico. The effectiveness of the PFM and the 
judicial system are tied together in a symbiotic relationship. Without an impactful justice 
system to issue adequate punishment of criminals, law enforcement agencies like the 
PFM will fall short of being an effective organization. 
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